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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH 
PETER LYSENKO, ) 
Plaintiff-Appellant, ) Case No. 980011-CA 
vs. ) 
MITCHELL J. SAWAYA and ) Oral Argument 
LILLIE MARIE SAWAYA, ) Priority 15 
Defendants-Appellees. ) 
JURISDICTION 
This court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 
Utah Code Annotated, Sec. 78-2a-3(2)(j) (Supp. 1997). 
ISSUES PRESENTED 
1. Did the trial court correctly grant Peter Lysenko 
("Lysenko") damages for conversion based on the salvage value 
testified to by Lysenko!s expert rather than in-place value of 
the equipment? 
2. Did the trial court correctly grant Lysenko damages 
for conversion based upon salvage value rather than awarding 
Lysenko possession of the converted equipment when the prayer 
of Lysenko's Complaint did not seek possession of the equipment, 
when at trial Lysenko sought damages or possession in the 
alternative and when some of the equipment had been repaired or 
thrown away? 
The trial court's determination of the appropriate damages 
for conversion will not be set aside unless its determination 
is clearly erroneous. Henderson v. For-Shore Co., 757 P. 2d 465, 
468 (Utah App. 1988). 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
None. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case, Course of Proceedings and 
Disposition Below. 
This action was originally commenced by Curtis Loosli as 
Plaintiff on October 19, 1994. [R. 4] The Complaint alleged 
that Defendants-Appellees Mitchell J. Sawaya and Lillie Marie 
Sawaya (the "Sawayas") had converted certain equipment owned by 
Plaintiff located at a Burger King Restaurant in Orem, Utah, 
previously leased and operated by Lysenko. The Sawayas were 
Burger King's landlords. Burger King, in turn, subleased to 
Lysenko. The Complaint also contained a count for declaratory 
relief that Plaintiff owned the equipment, and for injunctive 
relief. The prayer of the Complaint sought the replacement cost 
of the equipment or, alternatively, the fair market value 
thereof; a declaration that Plaintiff owned the equipment; and 
an injunction prohibiting the Sawayas from selling or conveying 
any interest in the equipment. 
Shortly before trial, Lysenko was substituted as 
Plaintiff. The case was tried to the court on October 3 and 4, 
2 
1996. [R. 2-79] At trial, Lysenko asked for the value of the 
equipment or possession thereof. [R. 257] 
At the close of trial the court took the matter under 
advisement and on October 18, 1996, entered a Memorandum 
Decision finding that the Sawayas had converted the equipment 
and awarding judgment against the Sawayas for the salvage value 
of the equipment in the amount of $12,980.00, plus interest and 
costs. [R. 291-83] Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
were entered by the court [R. 335-23] on March 21, 1997 and a 
judgment was entered on that same day. [R. 33 8-3 6] 
Thereafter, Lysenko filed a Motion for Amendment to 
Findings and Judgment, or for New Trial, which was denied by the 
court by Memorandum Decision entered July 30, 1997. [R. 361-57] 
A final Order denying the motion was filed on August 20, 1997. 
[R. 363-62] 
B. Statement of Facts. 
1. On May 22, 1978, the Sawayas as lessors entered into 
a Ground Lease Agreement with Burger King Corporation as lessee 
for property located at 1075 South State Street, Orem, Utah (the 
"Premises"). The lease provided for a 15-year term and Burger 
King was given the option to extend the term for five additional 
periods of five years each. [Finding of Fact No. 1] 
2. Under the Sawaya-Burger King lease, any additions or 
improvements would remain the property of the Sawayas if not 
removed within 15 days after termination of the lease. [Finding 
of Fact No. 3] 
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3. Burger King constructed a restaurant building on the 
Premises and then entered into a Lease/Sublease Agreement with 
Lysenko on February 6, 1979. [Findings of Fact No. 4] 
4. The Lysenko-Burger King agreement stated that Burger 
King's ownership of the improvements was subject to its ground 
lease with the Sawayas. The sublease further stated that any 
personalty installed by Lysenko would remain his property after 
termination of the lease. [Findings of Fact Nos. 5 and 8] 
5. On January 12, 1993, Central Bank filed a UCC-1 
Financing Statement which was secured by the Burger King 
Restaurant including equipment, fixtures, furniture, signs, 
improvements, accessories, extensions and additions related to 
the restaurant. [Finding of Fact No. 12] 
6. Burger King terminated Lysenko's franchise agreement 
for default on February 2, 1993. The termination prohibited 
Lysenko from using the Burger King System and the Burger King 
Marks. [Finding of Fact No. 10] 
7. On November 30, 1993, the Sawayas1 counsel informed 
Central Bank, Lysenko and Burger King that all improvements, 
personal property and equipment were to be removed with 15 days 
after February 6, 1994, pursuant to the ground lease between the 
Sawayas and Burger King, or the property would be forfeited to 
the Sawayas. [Finding of Fact No. 11] 
8. In a letter dated January 26, 1994, the Sawayas" 
counsel indicated that he understood the Lysenko's claim to the 
restaurant property was subject to the claims of Burger King and 
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Central Bank and that, therefore, the Sawayas were not in a 
position to allow Lysenko to enter the Premises and remove any 
property. [Finding of Fact No. 13] 
9. On February 7, 1994, Lysenko informed the Sawayas he 
would commence moving the property on February 11, 1994. At 
that time, Lysenko requested that someone be present to unlock 
the building as the locks had been changed. [Finding of Fact 
No. 14] 
10. Loosli, who was a former employee of Lysenko, had 
agreed to purchase Central Bank's security interest in the 
equipment, which purchase was funded by Lysenko. The 
consideration for this purchase was work that Loosli had 
previously done as an employee of Lysenko's. [Finding of Fact 
No. 15] 
11. On February 8, 1994, Central Bank sold to Loosli its 
rights in the equipment. [Finding of Fact No. 16] 
12. On May 28, 1996, Loosli conveyed all the equipment 
to Lysenko subject to the Loosli-Central Bank agreement. 
[Finding of Fact No. 17] 
13. Lysenko was never able to enter the Premises and 
remove the equipment after his lease with Burger King 
terminated. [Finding of Fact No. 18] 
14. Lysenko's expert, L. Reid Steenblik, testified that 
two measures exist for determining the value of restaurant 
equipment. Those measures are in place value which measures the 
value of equipment as a going concern; and salvage value, which 
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measures the value of equipment to be removed from the 
restaurant and sold. [Findings of Fact No. 19] 
15. According to Steenblik, the in-place value of the 
equipment was $35,185.00. The salvage value of the equipment 
was $10,980.00. In addition, certain equipment had been 
disposed of following termination of the Sawaya-Burger King 
lease. That equipment only had a nominal value of $2,000.00. 
Thus, the total salvage value was $12,980.00. [Findings of Fact 
Nos. 20 and 21] 
16. David Williams was a member of HB Properties, LLC. 
which leased the Premises from the Sawayas after termination of 
the Lysenko lease at an initial lease rate of $2,500.00 per 
month. [R. 378, pp. 220-222; Plaintiff's Ex. 16] 
17. When Mr. Williams inspected the equipment in the 
restaurant he saw equipment that had not been operating since 
the '70s. [R. 378, p. 221] 
18. Much of the equipment at the restaurant was old and 
dilapidated. Extensive repairs were done to the equipment and 
other equipment was thrown out. [R. 378, pp. 222-232] 
19. The prayer of Lysenko's Complaint did not seek 
possession of the equipment. Instead, Lysenko sought damages 
for conversion. [R. 4-1] 
20. When Lysenko filed his memorandum in support of his 
Motion for Amendment of Findings and Judgment or for New Trial, 
he asserted that the court "should amend its trial order to 
award Peter Lysenko the full value in place of the improvements 
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and equipment retained by Sawayas. Alternatively, the Court 
should grant a new trial."1 [R. 322-319] 
21. Lysenko's Docketing Statement on this appeal stated 
the issue was whether the trial court had erred by awarding 
salvage value of the equipment rather than in-place value. No 
issue was raised concerning the trial court's failure to award 
possession of the equipment to Lysenko. [See Appendix A] 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
1. The trial court correctly awarded Lysenko the salvage 
value of the equipment. Lysenko's own expert, Reid Steenblik, 
testified that there were two values for used restaurant 
equipment. One value is the in-place value of equipment used as 
part of a going concern. The other value is salvage value for 
equipment that would be removed from the premises and sold. 
Damages for conversion are intended to compensate the Plaintiff 
for the actual loss suffered as a result of the conversion. The 
court acted well within its discretion in determining that the 
actual loss to Lysenko was represented by the salvage value of 
the equipment because he could not use the equipment on the 
Premises. 
Lysenko attempted to raise an unjust enrichment claim for 
the first time months after trial. Lysenko was not entitled to 
In Lysenko's motion, he asked that the court amend its 
judgment to award the full amount of $35,449.00 or, alternatively, 
grant Lysenko the right to remove his equipment or, alternatively, 
for a new trial. [R. 317] However, the supporting memorandum made 
no mention whatsoever of a request to remove the equipment. 
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raise this new theory at that time. There was no evidence of 
unjust enrichment presented at trial, nor was the issue of 
whether the Sawayas were unjustly enriched and, if so, the 
amount of such enrichment litigated at trial. 
2. The trial court did not commit error in not awarding 
Lysenko possession of the equipment. Lysenko always primarily 
sought damages. In fact, the prayer of his Complaint sought 
damages only; it did not contain a request for possession of the 
equipment. At trial, Lysenko sought damages based upon his own 
expert's testimony or, in the alternative, possession of the 
equipment. When Lysenko filed his motion to amend the findings, 
etc. months after trial, the memoranda he filed with the court 
only claimed that the court should have awarded the in-place 
value of the equipment rather than salvage value. The memoranda 
contained not one word about any argument that the court should 
have awarded Lysenko possession of the equipment. And, when 
Lysenko filed his Docketing Statement with this court, he only 
claimed that the trial court erred in refusing to award the in-
place value of the equipment. Lysenko did not claim that the 
trial court's failure to award possession of the equipment to 
him constituted error or was an issue on this appeal. 
The trial court acted well within its discretion in 
awarding damages rather than possession of the property, 
especially given the fact that Lysenko always sought damages. 
The evidence demonstrated that much of the equipment was old and 
dilapidated. Equipment had to be extensively repaired before it 
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could be used. Other equipment was thrown away. There would 
have been damage to the premises in removing the equipment. 
And, Lysenko had no restaurant in which he could have used the 
equipment. Although Lysenko testified that he could use 
particular items of equipment if he opened up a new restaurant 
and that he was "looking to reopen a restaurant", the trial 
court was no. bound to believe that testimony or to award 
Lysenko possession based upon some vague intent to perhaps open 
a restaurant some time in the future. 
ARGUMENT 
A. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY AWARDED THE SALVAGE VALUE 
OF THE EQUIPMENT. 
The deposition of Lysenko's expert, Reid Steenblik, was 
read into evidence at trial. Mr. Steenblik testiiied as to his 
opinion of the salvage value of the equipment and the in-place 
value of the equipment. The court essentially adopted Mr. 
Steenblik's salvage value figures and ruled that: 
In order to compensate the Plaintiff for actual 
losses, his damages should be limited to the value he 
would receive by removing the equipment from the Burger 
King Restaurant. Therefore, this Court finds that the 
Plaintiff is entitled to the salvage value of that 
equipment which remains in the restaurant and is currently 
used, that being $10,980, as well as a nominal value for 
the equipment disposed of in the amount of $2,0 00.00. [R. 
285] 
The trial court determined that salvage value was the 
appropriate measure of value in order to compensate Lysenko for 
his actual losses. In this regard, the court based its decision 
in part on the fact that although some of the equipment 
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continued to be used at the premises, other pieces of equipment 
had been disposed of and replaced by newer equipment. [R. 3 61, 
para. 2] The testimony at trial was that much of the equipment 
was old and dilapidated and that extensive repairs had to be 
done to certain equipment and other equipment had to be 
replaced. [See Statement of Facts Nos. 18 & 19 above] 
The trial court properly recognized that the rules 
relating to the measure of damages for conversion are flexible 
and that the court had discretion to award damages so as to 
compensate Lysenko for actual losses. In Jenkins v. Equipment 
Center, Inc., 869 P.2d 1000, 1004 (Utah App. 1994) , cited by the 
trial court in its decision, this court set forth the following 
principles concerning damages in a conversion case: 
The Utah Supreme Court and this court have stated 
that generally, the measure of damages in a conversion 
action is the value of the property at the time of the 
conversion, plus interest. "'The damages in an action for 
conversion are measured by the sum of money necessary to 
compensate the plaintiff for all actual losses or injuries 
sustained as a natural and proximate result of the 
defendant's wrong.'" "Generally, damages for interference 
with the plaintiff's right to use the property are 
measured by the rental value of the item involved or by 
the reasonable cost of hiring a replacement item." . . . 
"However, rules relating to the measure of damages 
are flexible, and 'can be modified in the interest of 
fairness1. The primary objective in rendering an award 
of damages for conversion is to award the injured party 
full compensation for actual losses." [869 P.2d at 1004] 
[Emphasis added] 
These same principles were recognized by the Utah Supreme Court 
in Winters v. Charles Anthony, Inc., 586 P.2d 453, 454 (Utah 
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1978) and by this court in Henderson v. For-Shor Co., 757 P.2d 
465, 468-69 (Utah App. 1988). 
When Lysenko filed his Complaint, he sought damages for 
conversion measured by "the replacement cost of the personal 
property, or, alternatively, for the fair market value," 
[R. 1] When Lysenko filed his Motion for Amendment of Findings 
and Judgment or for New Trial several months after trial, 
Lysenko argued for the first time that the Sawayas had been 
unjustly enriched and that the proper measure of damages was not 
the loss to Lysenko, but instead was the benefit to the Sawayas 
under an unjust enrichment theory. Lysenko argued that the 
Sawayas were benefitted by the fact that the equipment remained 
on the premises because of their lease with HB Properties. 
However, the Complaint contained no claim for unjust enrichment 
and there was no evidence of unjust enrichment presented at 
trial. There was no absolutely no evidence that the rental 
amount the Sawayas received on the lease to HB Properties in the 
initial sum of $2,500.00 a month was a nickel more than they 
would have received without the old equipment being present or 
that $2,500.00 per month was more than a fair rent for the 
building, or that any other circumstances existed which made the 
receipt of the rent unjust. 
Lysenko argues that the court's award of damages based 
upon salvage value was contrary to the proper measure of damages 
for conversion "as established" in Bailev-Allen Co. v. Kurzet, 
876 P. 2d 421, 425 (Utah App. 1994) . This same argument was 
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raised by Lysenko for the first time on his motion for amendment 
of the findings, etc. when Lysenko raised his unjust enrichment 
claim for the first time. The trial court properly rejected the 
argument. Bailev-Allen was not even a conversion case and is 
not at all on point. 
In Bailev-Allen, a construction contractor filed suit on 
various theories, including unjust enrichment, to recover the 
value of services provided with respect to construction of a 
home prior to the time that the construction contract was 
terminated by the owner for breach. The trial court held that 
the contractor was entitled to recover for unjust enrichment 
even though the contractor had breached the contract by not 
providing evidence of insurance and by its lack of supervision 
of the project. This court agreed that unjust enrichment was 
an available theory, but reversed and remanded on the basis that 
there were insufficient findings to support the unjust 
enrichment award. 
Lysenko also tells the court in this regard that the trial 
court expressly found that the value to the Sawayas of the 
equipment was $35,185.00. That is not correct. All the trial 
court found was that the equipment had an in-place value of 
$35,185.00. The Sawayas never used the equipment. And, as set 
forth above, there was no evidence that the Sawayas got paid one 
nickel more for the lease of the building with the old equipment 
than they would have received without the equipment. Lysenko 
tries to substitute speculation for evidence by arguing that the 
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"income stream (of the lease with HB Properties) is obviously 
based on the in-place value of the equipment." [Appellant's 
Brief, p. 14] There was no such evidence presented at trial. 
Because the unjust enrichment claim was not raised by Lysenko 
until months after trial, neither party had an opportunity to, 
nor did, present evidence with respect to whether the Sawayas 
were unjustly enriched or, if so, the amount of such enrichment.2 
The trial court properly awarded Lysenko his actual loss 
represented by the salvage value of the equipment. 
B. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT COMMIT ERROR IN NOT AWARDING 
LYSENKO POSSESSION OF THE EQUIPMENT. 
Lysenko tells the court that he sought possession of the 
equipment in his Complaint and clearly expressed at trial that 
he wanted to recover possession of the equipment. [Appellant's 
Brief, p. 11] This is an overstatement. In fact, possession of 
2
 Lysenko also argues that HB Properties saved approximately 
$60,000 in equipping the Premises because the old equipment was 
left in place. That is incorrect. Mr. Williams testified that he 
did not have an exact figure for what he spent equipping the 
kitchen but it was "in the ball park" of $75,000. [R. 378, pp. 
228-229] Mr. Williams further testified that a couple of years 
earlier he had spent $135,000 to $140,000 to equip the Burger King 
Restaurant in Idaho Falls. [R. 378, pp. 233-234] There was no 
testimony that the equipment that needed to be purchased in the two 
restaurants was identical. Further, there was no evidence 
whatsoever on the cost of the extensive repairs to the existing 
equipment which would have to be taken into account in determining 
total costs of equipping the Premises. Finally, even if it is 
assumed that HB Properties would have had to spend $60,000 more for 
all new equipment, had it done so it would have had new equipment 
that would not have to be replaced as soon as old equipment and 
would not be subject to the same level of repairs and maintenance 
as old equipment. 
13 
the equipment was always an afterthought with Lysenko. What 
Lysenko pushed in the court below was an award of damages. 
The Complaint contained claims for damages for conversion, 
a declaratory judgment that Plaintiff owned the equipment and 
was entitled to possession of the equipment and injunctive 
relief prohibiting Defendants from selling or conveying any 
interest in the equipment. In the prayer of his Complaint, 
however, Plaintiff sought damages, but not possession of the 
equipment. [R. 4-1] 
The only claim that Lysenko proceeded with at trial was 
his claim for damages for conversion. In his closing argument, 
Lysenko's counsel asked the court to award him either the value 
of the equipment as damages or possession of the equipment. [R. 
378, p. 257] And, when Lysenko made his Motion for Amendment of 
Findings and Judgment or for New Trial, he argued only that the 
court should award him the in-place value of the equipment 
instead of salvage value. Lysenko said not one word in his 
initial memorandum or his reply memorandum about wanting 
possession of the equipment. [R. 322-319; 354-352]3 Finally, 
3
 In Plaintiff's Motion for Amendment of Findings and Judgment 
or for New Trial, Plaintiff stated: 
"Plaintiff hereby moves this Court for an order 
amending the judgment in this matter to the amount of 
$35,449.00. Alternatively, Plaintiff moves for an order 
granting Plaintiff the right to remove his equipment. 
Alternatively, Plaintiff moves for a new trial." [R. 317] 
However, Plaintiff never argued for possession of the equipment in 
his memoranda. 
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when Lysenko filed his Docketing Statement on this appeal, he 
only raised the issue of whether he should have been awarded in-
place value of the equipment. Lysenko did not claim the trial 
court's failure to award possession of the equipment to him was 
an issue on this appeal.4 Clearly, the possession claim is an 
after-thought. 
Under the circumstances of this case, especially where 
Plaintiff was arguing primarily for damages, the trial court 
acted well within its discretion in awarding damages rather than 
possession of the equipment. The evidence was that much of the 
equipment was old and in disrepair. David Williams testified 
that he had not seen much of that type of equipment since the 
1970s. Further, extensive repairs were required to be done to 
equipment before it could be used. And, it was obvious from the 
nature of some of the equipment that the Premises would have 
been damaged by removing it. 
In this regard, Lysenko argues that he was planning on 
opening a new restaurant and could have used most of the 
equipment from the Premises in his new restaurant. [Appellant's 
Brief, p. 9] Again, this is an overstatement of the record. 
Lysenko's only testimony in this regard was as follows: 
Q. Do you have use for these particular items yourself? 
A. I'm looking to reopen a restaurant. 
4
 Although the fact Lysenko did not list the failure to award 
as an issue in the Docketing Statement does not prevent Lysenko 
from raising the issue on appeal (Nelson v. Salt Lake city, 919 
P.2d 568 (Utah 1996), it does show the issue is an afterthought. 
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Q. Would you like these items returned to you? 
A. I could use most of them. 
[R. 377, p. 102] 
Lysenko did not testify to any specific plans for opening any 
specific restaurant, nor did he testify he actually wanted the 
items returned to him, nor did he testify as to which specific 
items he could use if he actually opened another restaurant. 
What Lysenko in fact wanted and requested from the court was 
damages represented by the value of the equipment. Lysenko just 
does not like the value figure which the court adopted based 
upon the testimony of Lysenko1 s own expert. And, of course, the 
court was not bound to believe Lysenko1s testimony about some 
vague contemplation of the possibility of opening another 
restaurant some day. 
As the authorities cited above demonstrate, the purpose 
of damages in a conversion case is to compensate the plaintiff 
for the value of what was lost. That is exactly what the damage 
award in this case did by awarding Lysenko salvage value, which 
is the value the equipment had if it were removed from the 
Premises. Lysenko's claim that the court erred by not awarding 
possession of the equipment to him should be rejected, both 
because Lysenko always sought damages and because the evidence 
fully supports the court's decision. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, it is respectfully submitted 
that the trial court's judgment should be affirmed. 
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DATED this ZA day of May, 1998 
BURBIDGE & MITCHELL 
STEPHBBDB. MTTCHELL 
Attorneys for 
Defendants-Appellees 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
PETER LYSENKO, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
vs. 
MITCHELL J. SAWAYA and LILLIE 
MARIE SAWAYA, 
Defendants-Appellees. 
DOCKETING STATEMENT 
Subject to Assignment 
to the Court of Appeals 
Case No. 970505 
Peter Lysenko subject this docketing statement pursuant to Rule 9 of the Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure. 
1. Judgment Sought to be Reviewed. The trial court entered its judgment on 
March 21, 1997. Lysenko served Plaintiffs Motion for Amendment of Findings and Judgment 
or for New Trial on March 18, 1997. No other motions under Rules 50(a) or (b), 52(b), 54(b), 
or 59 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure were filed. 
The trial court entered its Order denying the post-judgment motion on August 20, 1997. 
On plaintiffs motion, the court entered an Order on September 19, 1997, grailting a 30-day 
extension of time to appeal. Lysenko filed his Notice of Appeal on October 20, 1997. October 
19, the technical deadline for filing the notice of appeal, was a Sunday. The Notice of Appeal 
was filed on Monday, October 20, 1997, and was therefore timely. 
2. Jurisdiction. Jurisdiction is conferred on the Utah Supreme Court by Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)0) (1996). 
3. Claim for Damages. The complaint made a prayer for unspecified damages. 
The judgment was for $17,621.28. Plaintiffs new trial motion sought to increase the judgment 
to $35,449.00. 
4. Nature of Proceeding. This is an appeal from a final judgment of the Fourth 
Judicial District Court of Utah County in a civil case. 
5. Material Facts. Lysenko operated a Burger King restaurant on property owned 
by Sawayas. Burger King had initially leased the property from Sawayas and had constructed 
the restaurant building and then leased the building and property to Lysenko. Lysenko 
subsequently purchased the building from Burger King, but did not purchase the underlying 
property. Lysenko also purchased equipment to operate the restaurant. The lease between 
Sawayas and Burger King contained a provision purporting to vest title to the improvements and 
equipment on the property in Sawayas if the property was not removed within 15 days following 
termination of the lease. 
Burger King terminated its franchise with Lysenko and required that he vacate the 
premises. Lysenko sought to remove the equipment and other improvements, but Burger King 
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denied permission. The Sawayas' lease later terminated, and Lysenko made timely demand for 
access to the building in order to remove his equipment. Sawayas denied access. Lysenko 
brought this action seeking either the return of the equipment and other improvements or their 
reasonable value. 
Lysenko presented evidence at trial concerning the fair market value of the equipment 
converted by Sawayas. The evidence showed that the equipment had a liquidation value of 
$12,980.00, but that its value in place was $35,449.00. Notwithstanding evidence that Sawayas 
were benefitting from the full, in-place value of the equipment, the trial court awarded damages 
at only the liquidation value. 
6. Issue on Appeal and Standard of Review. 
Did the trial court err in selecting liquidation value, rather than in-place value, 
as the measure of damages for equipment and other property converted by a landlord, where the 
landlord was unjustly enriched by the full in-place value of the equipment? The determination 
of the appropriate standard for measuring damages is a conclusion of law which is reviewed for 
correctness. United Truck Rental Equipment Leasing. Inc. v. Kleenco Corp.T 929 P.2d 99, 106 
(Hawaii Ct. App. 1996); Beck v. State Department of Transportation and Public Facilities. 837 
P.2d 105, 116 (Alaska 1992). 
7. Statutes. Rules and Cases Believed to be Determinative of Issues. Bailey-Allen 
Co. v. Kurzet. 876 P.2d 421, 426 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) establishes the measure of damages as 
the benefit conferred on the defendant, rather than the plaintiffs detriment. 
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8. Attachments. 
a. Memorandum Decision, dated October 18, 1996. 
b. Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, entered March 21, 1997. 
c. Judgment, entered March 21, 1997. 
d. Plaintiffs Motion for Amendment of Findings and Judgment or for 
New Trial, mailed March 18, 1997. 
e. Memorandum Decision, dated July 30, 1997. 
f. Order, entered August 20, 1997. 
g. Ex Parte Motion for Extension of Time to Appeal, dated September 
19, 1997. 
h. Order Granting Ex Parte Motion for Extension of Time to Appeal, 
dated September 19, 1997. 
L Notice of Appeal, filed October 20, 1997. 
DATED this //** day of November, 1997. 
LESLIE W. SLAUGH, for: 
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN 
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellant 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was mailed to the 
following, postage prepaid, this / ^ day of November, 1997. 
Stephen B. Mitchell, Esq. 
Burbidge & Mitchell 
139 E. South Temple, Suite 2001 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
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